It seems that one of the keys to understanding the often-erratic works of Nietzsche is to first understand the opening injunction of Beyond Good and Evil. We must “Suppose that truth is a woman—and why not?... what is certain is that she has spurned him—leaving dogmatism of all types standing sad and discouraged”. For Nietzsche, to understand ‘truth’ we must approach it in a way that is decidedly not dogmatic and accept the ambiguity that comes with that approach.  As such, it makes sense that so much of Nietzsche’s positive philosophy appears buried beneath allusions of aphorism, things that we must tarry with if we want to unearth what lies beneath. Much of Nietzsche’s positive philosophy can be obtained with a deeper exploration of the people, images, and sects that Nietzsche mentions in Part 3 ‘the religious character. While it's probable that the same approach could be applied to any of the parts with similar results, however part 3 in particular covers themes of modern philosophical and religious thought that are especially worth pursuing.
All throughout this section of the work, Nietzsche makes direct allusions to important figures in the history of philosophy. Many of the names that he mentions come with implicit or explicit criticism, whereas some names are given an inexplicable amount of admiration. Ultimately, there are two allusions that seem to be the most philosophically interesting to pursue. The first is the significant amount of focus given to the character of Pascal, and a surprising amount of this attention is positive in some way. Secondly, there is the figure of Schopenhauer, with who Nietzsche had a very personal and strained relationship with, and whose appearance in this chapter of the book raises a few questions.
Nietzsche devotes a significant amount of time alluding to the religious figure of Pascal, and Pascal seems to be the only Christian scholar that Nietzsche does not harshly criticize. Pascal is the first and only figure that is directly alluded to in the first section of part 3, when Nietzsche claims that “For instance, it might take somebody who is himself as deep, as wounded, and as monstrous as Pascal’s intellectual conscience to figure out the sort of history that the problem of science and conscience has had in the soul of homines religiosi”. There are a few things that can be said about Nietzsche’s appraisal of Pascal in this passage. Strong language like ‘wounded’ and ‘monstrous’ seem to indicate a negative appraisal of Pascal’s nature, but this is oddly contrasted with a strange tone of twisted admiration. We see this again in the next part where Nietzsche asserts that “Pascal’s faith, which has the gruesome appearance of a protracted suicide of reason—a tough, long-lived, worm-like reason that cannot be killed at once and with a single stroke”. Secondary scholarship on the matter asserts that “Pascal held that even if the Christian faith was not capable of producing, it is the fearful possibility that it is, in fact, true that should compel us to prudently become a Christian. Pascal is a figure that fascinates Nietzsche. In AOM 408 he mentions him as one of several figures from who he will accept the judgment, while in EH he describes him as the most instructive victim of Christianity,". It seems that he is asserting that Pascal possesses a special kind of reason that makes him one of the few that are capable of understanding this problem of science and conscience. But what is this problem? And is it the problem, or the attempt to solve the problem that Nietzsche seems to harbor resentment towards. 
