@inproceedings{yang-etal-2025-chain,
    title = "Chain of Attack: Hide Your Intention through Multi-Turn Interrogation",
    author = "Yang, Xikang  and
      Zhou, Biyu  and
      Tang, Xuehai  and
      Han, Jizhong  and
      Hu, Songlin",
    editor = "Che, Wanxiang  and
      Nabende, Joyce  and
      Shutova, Ekaterina  and
      Pilehvar, Mohammad Taher",
    booktitle = "Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025",
    month = jul,
    year = "2025",
    address = "Vienna, Austria",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://preview.aclanthology.org/acl25-workshop-ingestion/2025.findings-acl.514/",
    pages = "9881--9901",
    ISBN = "979-8-89176-256-5",
    abstract = "The latent knowledge of large language models (LLMs) contains harmful or unethical content, which introduces significant security risks upon their widespread deployment. Conducting jailbreak attacks on LLMs can proactively identify vulnerabilities to enhance their security measures. However, previous jailbreak attacks primarily focus on single-turn dialogue scenarios, leaving vulnerabilities in multi-turn dialogue contexts inadequately explored. This paper investigates the resilience of black-box LLMs in multi-turn jailbreak attack scenarios from a novel interrogation perspective. We propose an optimal interrogation principle to conceal the jailbreak intent and introduce a multi-turn attack chain generation strategy called CoA. By employing two effective interrogation strategies tailored for LLMs, coupled with an interrogation history record management mechanis, it achieves a significant optimization of the attack process. Our approach enables the iterative generation of attack chains, offering a powerful tool for LLM red team testing. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs exhibit insufficient resistance under multi-turn interrogation, with our method shows more advantages(ASR, 83{\%} vs 64{\%}). This work offers new insights into improving the safety of LLMs."
}